We examine the impact of the 2006 Massachusetts healthcare reform on substance use disorder (SUD) treatment facilities' provision of care. We test the impact of the reform on treatment quantity and access. We couple data on the near universe of specialty SUD treatment providers in the USA with a synthetic control method approach. We find little evidence that the reform lead to changes in treatment quantity or access. Reform effects were similar among for-profit and non-profit facilities. In an extension, we show that the reform altered the setting in which treatment is received, the number of offered services, and the number of programs for special populations. These findings may be useful in predicting the implications of major health insurance expansions on the provision of SUD treatment.
INTRODUCTION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) represents a historic transformation of the American healthcare system. Key components of the ACA are new federal funds to allow states to expand their Medicaid programs to low-income adults, subsidized private insurance plans sold through online health insurance exchanges, standardization of covered benefits in private health insurance plans, and mandates to purchase insurance for individuals and some employers. The core provisions of this act went into effect in January 2014. Correspondingly, between 2013 and early 2015, the uninsured rate in the USA declined from 20% to 12% (Cohen et al., 2016) , and self-reported access to care improved (Sommers et al., 2015a) .
The ACA has the potential to be of particular benefit to the 20.2 million individuals in the USA with substance use disorders (SUDs) (Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 2015) as this act mandates generous coverage for SUD treatment services in both private and public insurance plans and provides new financial incentives to improve care coordination between primary care and SUD treatment providers (AndrewsSUD treatment among individuals seeking such treatment (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2014) .
Substance use disorders impacts extend beyond the individual with a disorder. For example, SUDs impose substantial costs on society as they are linked with increased healthcare use (Balsa et al., 2009; French et al., 2011) , mortality (Carpenter and Dobkin, 2009) , crime (Carpenter, 2007) , social service use (Jayakody et al., 2000) , and traffic accidents (Adams et al., 2012) . Therefore, the ACA, by expanding coverage for SUD treatment services, could also reduce social costs.
A necessary condition for the ACA to allow greater access to SUD treatment, improved outcomes for those with SUDs, and reduced social costs is capacity among treatment facilities to adequately respond to the ACA policy changes. SUD treatment facilities are known to have limited supply of treatment slots relative to demand, constrained financial resources, and inadequate use of basic administrative technologies such as electronic billing systems, and are isolated from the general healthcare delivery system (Levit et al., 2013; Buck, 2011; Capoccia et al., 2012; Carr et al., 2008; McLellan et al., 2003; Stein et al., 2015; Andrews et al., 2015a) . These vulnerabilities raise questions regarding the ability of SUD treatment facilities to adapt to new funding sources and other policy changes embedded in the ACA. Indeed, Molfenter (2014) assessed SUD treatment facility preparedness for the ACA in a sample of 427 facilities in 2010-2012 and found that most facilities were not adequately preparing, and Andrews et al. (2015a) document that states are doing little to assist SUD facilities adapt to ACA policy changes.
To gain insights to how SUD treatment facilities respond to major healthcare reforms such as the ACA, we look to a recent, analogous experience: the 2006 Massachusetts healthcare reform. The Massachusetts reform provides an excellent setting to explore the impacts of a large-scale insurance expansion such as the ACA, as the state law's effects were comprehensive and aimed at achieving near universal coverage. Moreover, the Massachusetts experience is considered the blueprint for the ACA (Gruber, 2011) , and Massachusetts provides generous coverage for SUD treatment services in qualifying private and public plans (The Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority, 2008 , Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015 .
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of the Massachusetts reform, and one of the first to study the impact of any major insurance reform, on the provision of SUD treatment using quasi-experimental methods. Moreover, prior related studies of health insurance expansions within the context of SUD treatment have almost exclusively focused on the perspective of consumers of SUD treatment and have relied on expansions that have affected smaller numbers of individuals, for example, state equal coverage expansions or 'parity laws' in private markets (Dave and Mukerjee, 2011; Wen et al., 2013) . By comparison, our study offers insight into the supply side (i.e., facilities that provide treatment) in the context of a large health insurance expansion designed to achieve near universal coverage.
We use detailed data on the near universe of US specialty SUD treatment facilities between 2000 and 2012 coupled with a synthetic control method (SCM) research design. We examine the impact of the reform on treatment quantity and access.
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populations (Ball and Ross, 2012; Olmstead et al., 2007) . Overall, well-designed treatments that recognize the complex and multifaceted nature of SUDs, are of adequate duration, use medications in combination with counseling, and address both the patient's addiction and overall well-being are most likely to reduce substance use and its associated social costs (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2012a).
In terms of reducing substance use, the effectiveness of SUD treatment, both outpatient and inpatient, is well documented within a broad range of patient populations (Reuter and Pollack, 2006; Stewart et al., 2002; Swensen, 2015; Lu and McGuire, 2002; Hubbard et al., 1997; Gossop et al., 2003) . For example, medication-assisted treatment for opioid use disorder has been shown to reduce opioid use among patients (Murphy and Polsky, 2016; Ball and Ross, 2012; Schackman et al., 2012) , brief screening interventions can reduce alcohol use among patients presenting at emergency rooms (Kunz et al., 2004) , physician advice can help older adults reduce problematic drinking (Mundt et al., 2005) , and treatment programs that address the unique characteristics of women with SUDs can reduce substance use within this population (Ashley et al., 2003; French et al., 2002a) .
More broadly, SUD treatment can reduce the costs to society of SUDs. Indeed, studies find that SUD treatment 'pays for itself', as every dollar invested in treatment yields several dollars of reduced social spending (Ettner et al., 2006; Mojtabai and Graff Zivin, 2003; Parthasarathy et al., 2001; Popovici and French, 2013) . For example, cost-effectiveness analyses of criminal justice-involved populations suggests that SUD treatment benefits, in particular through reduced criminal activity, exceed treatment costs (McCollister et al., 2013) . French et al. (2002b) estimate the benefit-cost ratio of five residential treatment programs in the state of Washington and find an average ratio of 4.34, providing evidence that treatment benefits exceed costs, while Daley et al. (2000) show that detoxification, methadone maintenance, residential, and outpatient treatment benefits exceed costs among pregnant women with SUDs.
The direct costs of SUD treatment in the USA are estimated to be $27 billion per year (Levit et al., 2008) , with public payers providing the majority (69%) of the financing for such treatment.
1 Thus, relative to general healthcare (for which public payers provide 49% of the financing), SUD treatment is heavily reliant on public funding. The financial responsibility of public payers is predicted to rise with full implementation of the ACA (Andrews et al., 2015b) .
Conceptual framework and hypotheses
We next review several possible pathways through which the Massachusetts healthcare reform potentially impacted the delivery of healthcare services following Kolstad and Kowalski (2012a) , with a focus on the unique characteristics of both the healthcare facilities that deliver SUD treatment and the patients receiving such care. We then use this insight to generate hypotheses to test in our empirical analysis.
In terms of the quantity of healthcare provided, the Massachusetts reform reduced the out-of-pocket price to consumers and this change should -all else equal -increase the quantity of healthcare services demanded. This increase in the quantity demanded may be amplified by general equilibrium effects in the delivery of healthcare services (Finkelstein, 2007) . At least two specific hypotheses support this prediction. First, the 'fixed cost hypothesis' suggests that a large-scale expansion of health insurance can plausibly induce healthcare facilities to introduce new services or invest in fixed costs (e.g., purchasing durable goods, accruing electronic billing systems, or hiring personnel) that do not vary across patients. That is, once these practice styles or fixed goods are introduced into the facility, they are available for all patients. Second, the 'spill-over' hypothesis suggests that changes in insurance status for one set of patients can have spill-over effects for patients of other insurance statuses (Glied and Zivin, 2002) . The source of such spill-overs may be joint production, malpractice fears, medical ethics, or facility income effects. While we cannot separate the impact of these two hypotheses in our empirical analyses, and indeed they may work in conjunction with one another, both suggest that the Massachusetts reform will increase the quantity of healthcare services delivered.
Expanded insurance coverage could also alter the patients facilities choose to accept. In the canonical framework of Sloan et al. (1978) , all else equal, profit-maximizing facilities will only accept publicly insured, (for example, Medicaid), and uninsured patients when they cannot fill their practices with better paying privately insured patients. The Massachusetts reform increased the size of the private and public markets and reduced the size of the uninsured market.
2 We expect that facilities will increase participation in the private market and decrease participation in the uninsured market, 3 while the impact on public market participation is ex ante ambiguous.
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The impact of the reform on charity care provision, that is, care that is provided without the expectation of payment or at a heavy discount, is unclear. On one hand, the reform may lead to substitution effects: the opportunity cost of charity care (treating insured patients) rises, which should decrease charity care provision. On the other hand, it is possible that, as the share of insured patients in a market increases following the Massachusetts healthcare reform, facilities have higher income that should increase their provision of charity care if such care is a normal good to providers (Chen, 2014) . The impact of the Massachusetts reform on charity care provision will depend on the relative magnitudes of opposing income and substitution effects.
While the preceding discussion suggests that reform will alter treatment provision, there is uncertainty regarding the magnitude of both the demand-and supply-side response. On the demand side, stigma surrounding SUD treatment may attenuate effects. Moreover, the majority of untreated individuals who suffer from SUDs do not recognize that they have a disorder and/or do not wish to stop using substances (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2014). Such individuals likely have low elasticity of demand for SUD treatment services, and insurance coverage is unlikely to lead to changes in quantity demanded.
On the supply side, capacity constraints 5 combined with financial instability within the SUD treatment delivery system (Andrews et al., 2015a) may limit the ability of facilities to respond to the reform in the short run. Specifically, many SUD treatment facilities operate at capacity and/or with constrained finances and thus may not have any open slots, or financing available to expand treatment slots, to which they can admit patients (Carr et al., 2008; McLellan and Meyers, 2004) . Moreover, historically, there has been low penetration of insurance (public and private) within the SUD treatment delivery system, and facilities may lack the administrative capacity (e.g., electronic encounter systems and personnel) to bill insurers. 6 Those individuals who gain insurance through the Massachusetts reform may have different treatment needs (e.g., severity of SUD) or preferences (e.g., type of treatment) to those individuals who held coverage for these services prior to the reform. SUD treatment facilities are likely to incorporate newly insured patient needs and preferences, if they depart from those of existing patients, into their delivery of treatment services in the postreform period. Moreover, if uninsured patients use health care differentially than insured patients (e.g., the uninsured may make limited use of follow-up care), insurance gains may impact the types of care provided to the newly insured. Such differences could further alter the amount of services provided.
The previous discussion leads us to two specific hypotheses on the extent to which the Massachusetts healthcare reform will affect SUD treatment quantity and access: H1 (quantity): The number of individuals receiving SUD treatment services will increase. H2 (access): Access to SUD treatment services will increase among the privately insured and decrease among the uninsured.
The impacts of the reform on access to SUD treatment services among the publicly insured and the provision of charity care is ex ante ambiguous as the net effects are determined by multiple factors that operate in opposing directions.
Reform impacts
An extensive literature has explored the impact of Massachusetts' reform on outcomes related to access, utilization, and health. In general, studies have found that the reform increased insurance coverage Long, 2008) , increased access to a usual source of care (Long and Masi, 2009) , increased use of preventive and ambulatory care (Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012a; Miller, 2012b) , decreased use of avoidable care (Miller, 2012a; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012a) , and improved health (Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014; Sommers et al., 2015b) .
However, there is scant evidence on the impact of the Massachusetts reform on SUD treatment or SUDs. To the best of our knowledge, only one prior study has examined this question: Capoccia et al. (2012) interviewed staff at five non-profit Massachusetts SUD facilities after the reform. Admissions were relatively flat postreform, and some services that had been previously supported by public payers decreased. Most facilities experienced increases in revenue, but did not receive an influx of new patients. Facilities were able to expand service offerings to some extent, but copayment requirements constrained facilities because unpaid copayments were absorbed as a loss by facilities. Administrative burdens from insurers were cited as obstacles to expansions. These descriptive findings suggest that the expansion of insurance coverage induced by the reform may not have straightforwardly translated to increased utilization or changes in offered services. However, the five facilities studied by Capoccia et al. (2012) are not necessarily representative of the facilities in the state, and without a comparison group, it is difficult to disentangle trends in Massachusetts from other contemporaneous trends.
A recent paper by Maclean et al. (2015) is most closely related to our study; in that, it examines changes in treatment provision following insurance reform -state mandates for equal coverage ('parity') of SUD treatment in private insurance plans. Findings suggest that admissions and client volumes increase in response to insurance mandates. Facilities increase (decrease) acceptance of private (public) insurance and reduce provision of charity care. Although this paper is important, it focuses exclusively on private insurance expansions (i.e., they expand coverage for previously insured individuals) and cannot provide evidence on the impacts of large-scale health reform, such as the Massachusetts reform and ACA, which simultaneously increase private and public coverage among a large share of the population.
DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHODS

National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services
Our primary data source is the National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS). We focus on the years 2000-2012. 7 SAMHSA defines a specialty SUD treatment facility as a hospital, a residential SUD facility, an outpatient SUD treatment facility, or other facility with an SUD treatment program that offers: (i) outpatient, inpatient, or residential/rehabilitation SUD treatment; (ii) detoxification treatment; (iii) opioid treatment; or (iv) halfway-house services that include SUD treatment. The N-SSATS data provide a 'snapshot' of 1 day, near the end of March, of a facility's operations.
8 N-SSATS administrators send a survey to all known specialty facilities each year. A staff member completes the survey. Over our study period, the N-SSATS response rates are over 91% in each year. The N-SSATS is an unbalanced panel of facilities. Following the literature, we exclude the reform year (2006) from the analysis (Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012b) .
Outcome variables
We consider several margins along which SUD facilities may respond to the Massachusetts health reform as suggested by our conceptual framework. Specifically, we focus on: quantity and access. 9 We measure the quantity of healthcare services provided by facilities with the annual number of admissions and the total number of clients in a facility on the census day ('daily census'). We take the logarithm of these variables to address skewness; thus coefficients have the interpretation of an approximation to the percent change. We expect that treatment quantity will increase following the reform (H1).
We examine forms of accepted payment: private health insurance, Medicaid, non-Medicaid public health insurance (i.e., Medicare, state-financed insurance, and Federal military), and self-payment ('self-pay'). These variables proxy for treatment access. 10 We also consider the provision of charity care: acceptance of a sliding-fee-scale, other forms of pay assistance, and provision of uncompensated care. We expect that access will increase following the reform for the privately insured and decrease for the uninsured (H2). The impact of the reform on access among the publicly insured and the provision of charity care is ex ante ambiguous (H2).
We consider heterogeneity in facility response on the basis of ownership status in all analyses: private for-profit facilities and non-profit facilities (government, private non-profit). Previous work suggests that for-profits and non-profits have different objective functions (Sloan et al., 2001; Bachhuber et al., 2014) , and thus we may expect them to respond differentially to large-scale changes in the healthcare market such as the 2006 Massachusetts healthcare reform.
State-level variables
Our research design, described in the next section, is the SCM (Abadie et al., 2010; Abadie et al., 2015; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) . Therefore, we must select a set of variables that predict our SUD treatment outcomes. To this end, we merge several state-level variables into the N-SSATS.
First, we merge in demographic variables (sex, age, race/ethnicity, education, family income, and insurance coverage 11 ) from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (ASEC) into the N-SSATS on state and year. Economic conditions may influence insurance coverage and need for SUD treatment (Cawley et al., 2015; Davalos et al., 2012) . We proxy economic conditions with the seasonally adjusted annual state unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics database. We also include the share of the adult population ages 18 years and older that reports binge drinking (defined by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as consuming 4/5 or more drinks per drinking session for women/men) from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey to measure preferences for substance use and/or need for treatment. 8 Due to changes in the survey, the census day is near the end of September in 2000. 9 Due to missingness in the data, our sample sizes in regression differences-in-differences models reported later in the manuscript vary to some extent across outcomes. 10 We refer to these variables as 'access' variables, but we note that payment acceptance is just one component of access to treatment.
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to study other dimensions of access. 11 We consider all types of insurance: private (group and non-group) and public (Medicare, Medicaid, military, etc.).
We also include several state policies and characteristics that may proxy for state preferences toward substance use and addiction treatment and potentially access to SUD treatment within the criminal justice system; this population has elevated need for SUD treatment (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2014). Specifically, we include indicator variables for marijuana decriminalization (Pacula et al., 2003) , 12 a medical marijuana law , the state beer tax per gallon (Brewers' Almanac), whether the state regulates SUD coverage treatment in private health insurance markets (National Council of State Legislatures, 2015) , and a prescription drug monitoring program (National Council of Model State Drug Programs). 13 We include an indicator for a Democrat governor (University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research, 2015) , 14 the number of police officers (American Community Survey), and the number of property crimes per 100,000 (Department of Justice Uniform Crime Reports). To proxy for the resources available to support SUD treatment, we merge in the number of physicians, surgeons, and nurses, and the state tax revenues from the ASEC. Finally, we include the state population from the US Census Bureau.
Methods
Our research objective is to estimate the causal effect of the Massachusetts healthcare reform on SUD treatment outcomes. To meet this objective, we require a comparison group of states that reflect the counterfactual path in our outcome variables for Massachusetts had this state not implemented its 2006 healthcare reform. There are alternative approaches to selecting such a set of states. For example, we could select states that are geographically proximate to Massachusetts or some other combination of US states to form the comparison group (Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012a; Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014) . In our main analyses, we chose to apply the SCM developed in a series of studies by Abadie and colleagues (Abadie et al., 2010; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2015) . SCM implements a data-driven search for an optimal 'synthetic' Massachusetts within a set of pre-specified 'donor' states.
The synthetic Massachusetts generated by SCM is a weighted average of the donor states. SCM compares trends between Massachusetts and the synthetic Massachusetts to estimate the effect of the 2006 reform. This approach was initially developed to study the effect of armed conflict on economic outcomes (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) . Since its initial application, the use of SCM has proliferated within the economics literature. More specifically, SCM has been utilized to estimate, for example, the effects of medical marijuana laws on body weight and opioid addiction (Sabia et al., 2017; Powell et al., 2015) , soda taxation on diet and body weight (Fletcher et al., 2015) , regulation of prostitution on sexually transmitted diseases (Quast and Gonzalez, 2016) , effect of minimum wage increases on employment (Neumark et al., 2014) , and immigration reform on labor market outcomes (Bohn et al., 2014) . We next present an abridged description of the SCM approach tailored to our application. We refer interested readers to Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie et al. (2015) for more detailed reviews of this approach.
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Suppose that there is a sample of J units (in our study these units are US states) indexed by j. Unit j = 0 is the treated unit (in our study Massachusetts), and j = 1 to j = J are potential comparison units, which are collectively referred to as the 'donor pool'. We observe all units over the same time period: t = 1 , … , T. The panel is assumed to be strongly balanced. This time period is composed of a positive number of pre-intervention periods (T 0 ); in our study, the intervention is the 2006 reform, and therefore, the pre-intervention period is 2000 to 2005, and a positive number of post-intervention periods (T 1 ), 2007 to 2012 in our study, with T = T 0 + T 1 . Unit 12 We thank Rosalie Pacula for sharing an updated decriminalization coding scheme with us. 13 Ideally, we would like to include state policy variables that reflect access to SUD treatment within the criminal justice system as incarcerated individuals have elevated need for SUD treatment relative to the general population. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no uniform data set that collects such policies. We refer readers to an excellent review of this issue by Belenko et al. (2013) . 14 Because the District of Columbia does not have a governor, we treat the major of D.C. as the de facto governor. However, our results are not appreciably different if we instead exclude D.C. from the analysis or if we exclude the governor variable from set of state-level variables. 15 Our description of the SCM approach relies heavily on the work of Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie et al. (2015) . 0 (Massachusetts) is treated by the intervention in periods T 0 + 1 , . . , T, and the intervention is assumed to have no impacts on outcomes in the pre-intervention period. Moreover, the donor pool members are assumed to be unaffected by the treatment.
Following Abadie and colleagues, the synthetic control can be represented by a (J * 1) vector of weights W = (w 1 , … , w J ) 0 . The weights are selected such that (i) all weights are positive (0 ≤ w j ≤ 1) for j = 1 , … , J and (ii) the weights sum to one ∑ J 1 w j ¼ 1 . Further, let X 1 be a (k * 1) vector containing the values of pre-reform characteristics 16 of the treated unit (Massachusetts), and let X 0 be a (k * J) matrix containing the values of these same pre-intervention variables for the units in the donor pool.
The SCM seeks to locate a vector of weights that can be applied to X 0 to match the values of X 1 as closely as possible. More specifically, the SCM approach minimizes the difference between the pre-intervention characteristics of the treated unit and the synthetic control; this difference is given by the vector: X 1 À X 0 W. Selecting the synthetic control is equivalent to selecting the W * that minimizes this difference. W * is the solution to the following constrained minimization problem:
where V is a (k * k) diagonal positive-definitive matrix. The diagonal elements of V reflect the relative weights for the contribution of the square of the elements in the vector X 0 À X 1 W to the objective function being minimized. The SCM estimates of the treatment effects arê
More specifically this estimate is the difference in the evolution of outcomes between Massachusetts and its synthetic control.
Following Abadie et al. (2015) , we exclude several states from the donor pool that are deemed to be inappropriate on the basis of prior information. First, we exclude California, Maine, Oregon, and Vermont as these states experienced some form of state-level healthcare reform during our study period (Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014) . Second, we exclude New Mexico and Texas as these states have very high rates of un-insurance during in the pre-intervention period.
17 These exclusions leave us with 44 states in the donor pool. The preintervention variables (mean values) that we include in X 0 and X 1 are the outcome variable (which varies across outcomes), and the state-level characteristics and policies outlined in Section 3.3.
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In addition to applying SCM, we appeal to the insight of Bohn et al. (2014) and use the evolution of outcomes in Massachusetts and the SCM-identified synthetic Massachusetts to construct a simple differencesin-differences ( To explore the statistical significance of our DD estimates, we apply a permutation test developed by Abadie et al. (2010) as adapted by Bohn et al. (2014) for the DD estimator outlined in Equation 3. We sequentially treat each of the donor states as though it was the treated unit, construct a synthetic control (i.e., solve for W * in constrained minimization problem outlined in Equation (1) . We omit Massachusetts from the set of donor states in the placebo estimation (Bohn et al., 2014) . The distribution of these Massachusetts and placebo DD estimates provides us with the sampling distribution for DD MA , which we can use to assess statistical significance of our treatment effects.
The basic logic of this inference approach is that if the Massachusetts healthcare reform had an effect on our outcomes, then we would expect that the treatment effect estimated in Equation 3 for Massachusetts should deviate substantially from the comparable placebo estimates. More specifically, given that we estimate 45 DD estimates (1 for Massachusetts and 44 for the members of the donor pool), the estimate of DD MA must be among the two smallest or two largest to be considered statistically different from zero at the 10% level. 
RESULTS
Establishing a synthetic Massachusetts
The values of our outcome and predictor variables in the pre-reform period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) are reported for Massachusetts and all 44 states in the donor pool (Table I) . We report the statistical significance of the differences in these variables across groups using t-tests for continuous variables and χ 2 tests for binary variables. Table II Root mean squared prediction error 0.0916 -The differences in these variables are both practically and statistically significant between the two groups across all outcome and predictor variables. Table II reports, for each outcome that we consider, the states that receive a positive weight and the specific weight. These weights reflect the non-zero weights in W * . The specific weights and states vary across our outcome variables. For example, our synthetic Massachusetts for the logarithm of the total number of admissions is composed of Arizona (7.5%), New York (9.9%), South Carolina (43.7%), and Virginia (39.0%), while our synthetic Massachusetts for acceptance of private insurance is composed of Colorado (7.8%), Connecticut (20.2%), the District of Columbia (1%), Maryland (41.5%), Minnesota (2.4%), New Jersey (11.8%), New York (8.6%), and Pennsylvania (6.8%).
For each outcome of interest, we are able to achieve relatively good balance between Massachusetts and synthetic Massachusetts in terms of that outcome and the state-level covariates. This balance is illustrated for annual admissions (Table IIIA) , daily census (Table IIIB) , private insurance acceptance (Table IIIC) , Medicaid acceptance (Table IIID) , non-Medicaid public insurance acceptance (Table IIIE) , self-payment acceptance (Table IIIF) , and charity care provision (Table IIIG) . In each of these tables, we report the root mean squared prediction error. The value of the root mean squared prediction error ranges from a low of 0.0108 (Medicaid acceptance) to a high of 0.0916 (admissions), while there are some differences between Massachusetts and its synthetic control (which again varies across outcome). Table IV shows the DD coefficients comparing trends in Massachusetts to synthetic Massachusetts for each of the main study outcomes: measures of treatment quantity and access. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the trends in the logarithm of admissions and daily census in Massachusetts and synthetic Massachusetts, respectively. The DD estimates for total admissions and daily census both indicate moderate increases (11.0% and 11.6%, respectively) but are not statistically significant on the basis of the empirical distribution of the DD estimates in our placebo testing. More specifically, the estimate for annual admissions falls 39th of 45 estimates, when estimates are ranked from the smallest to the largest, and the estimate for daily census falls 35th of 45. We also report graphical statistical testing of the trends in differences between Massachusetts and synthetic Massachusetts, along with each placebo-treated unit and its corresponding synthetic control, in Appendix Figures A (annual admissions) and B (daily census). The findings from this graphical analysis are comparable: the differences between Massachusetts and synthetic Massachusetts do not deviate from the placebo trends in differences.
Effect of the reform on treatment quantity and access
The similarity in the sign and magnitude of admissions and daily census DD estimates is in line with there being no change in the length of stay for Massachusetts following the healthcare reform, relative to synthetic Massachusetts. We cannot rule out other possibilities in our data, however. For example, newly insured patients may have comparable SUDs with previously insured patients, leading to no change in length of stay. Moreover, the admissions and daily census estimates are imprecise. We interpret these findings and their implications for length of stay and patient outcomes with caution and encourage readers to do the same Table IV also shows trends in the measures of accepted forms of payments and provision of charity care, our measure of treatment access. The DD estimates are relatively small compared with the proportions in Massachusetts in the pre-reform period and are not statistically distinguishable from zero. For example, the estimated change in private insurance acceptance is 0.037 percentage points (an increase of 5.4% over the Massachusetts pre-reform proportion), but does not approach statistical significance (falling 35th of out of 45 estimates). The trends in acceptance of other payment methods and charity care provision for Massachusetts and the synthetic controls are shown in Figures 3 (private insurance), 4 (Medicaid insurance), Root mean squared prediction error 0.0205 -5 (non-Medicaid public insurance), 6 (self-pay), and 7 (charity care) in Massachusetts and the SCM-identified synthetic Massachusetts. We report graphical analyses of statistical significance in the trends of differences between Massachusetts and its synthetic control in Appendix Figures C (private insurance), D (Medicaid insurance), E (non-Medicaid public insurance), F (self-pay), and G (charity care). Comparable with the previously noted statistical testing based on the distribution of DD estimates, graphical analysis of the evolution of differences between Massachusetts and its synthetic control provide no evidence that the reform had an effect on our treatment access outcomes.
Ownership status
We next stratify the data by ownership status, separately applying SCM to the for-profit and non-profit samples (Table VA and VB) . For brevity, we report only the analysis of DD estimates, but graphical analysis of the evolution outcomes in Massachusetts and its synthetic controls, and graphical inference analysis are available on request. Comparable with the full sample of results, we find no evidence that the reform had a statistically significant impact on any of our treatment quantity or access measures among either for-profit or non-profit facilities.
EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Treatment setting, offered services, and special programs
In a supplementary analysis, reported in Appendix Table I , we examine changes in treatment setting (inpatient and outpatient; only 12% of the sample provides SUD treatment in both of these settings), the types of services Root mean squared prediction error 0.0108 -offered, and special programs provided. Specifically, we consider the following service and program variables: (i) testing services, 19 (ii) services associated with quality measurement or outcome tracking, 20 and (iii) wraparound services intended to provide psychosocial support, 21 and (iv) the number of programs for special populations. 22, 23 For brevity, we report only the analysis of DD estimates. We find evidence that while inpatient client volume did not significantly change, outpatient client volume significantly increased by 34.5% (the DD estimate falls 44th out of 45). We also find evidence of an increase in testing services of 0.39 services (the DD estimate falls 45th out of 45), or 14.5%, and a decrease in the number of special programs offered of 0.74 programs (the DD estimate falls second out of 45), or 26.3%.
Market entrance
A concern with our analysis is that our findings may be driven by changes in the composition of facilities. For example, facilities may enter the Massachusetts SUD treatment market post-reform as a 19 Comprehensive mental health assessment at intake, blood alcohol testing, urine drug and alcohol testing, HIV testing, other STD testing, and tuberculosis screen. 20 Discharge planning, aftercare counseling, acupuncture, individual counseling, group counseling, family counseling, outcome follow-up after discharge, and non-English treatment provided. 21 Case management, child care, social services assistance, employment assistance, housing assistance, domestic violence education, HIV/AIDS education, and transportation assistance. 22 Adolescents, those with co-occurring mental health and substance use disorders, HIV/AIDS, gays/lesbians, seniors, women, pregnant or postpartum women, and men. 23 We thank Dr. Kenneth Stoller, an addiction psychiatrist who is the director of a comprehensive outpatient substance use disorder treatment program at Johns Hopkins Hospital, for assistance in constructing the service and program variables. Root mean squared prediction error 0.0130 -response to an increase in demand from the newly insured. We explore this possibility by examining the evolution of the number of facilities in Massachusetts and its synthetic control. We find evidence of a reduction in the number of facilities of 37.4 facilities in Massachusetts relative to synthetic Massachusetts in the post-reform period. Relative to the pre-reform mean in Massachusetts (336.6), this coefficient estimates implies an 11.2% reduction in the number of facilities. While we cannot definitively test the mechanisms behind this decline in facilities, it is conceivable that facilities consolidated or merged or that some facilities excited the market. However, the DD estimate is imprecise; thus, we interpret this finding with caution.
Alternative research design: regression differences-in-differences
As an alternative to the SCM approach, we report estimates generated in a standard differences-in-differences (DD) regression model of the following form:
where Y ist is an outcome variable for facility i in state s in time t. 24 DD st is the interaction between an indicator for Massachusetts and the post-period, X st is a vector of state-level controls, γ s is a vector of state fixed effects, τ t is a vector of year fixed effects, and Ω st is a vector of state-specific linear time trends (we interact a time trend 24 Thus, we use the microdata for our DD analysis. (Cameron and Miller, 2015) . We therefore only report statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level rather than through to the standard 10%. The comparison group in our DD models consists of the SCM donor states each with equal weighting (i.e., all non-Massachusetts states except California, Maine, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont) instead of synthetic Massachusetts (Appendix Table 3A ). We estimate these models twice, first with a more parsimonious set of controls ('short controls') and second with the full set of controls used in the SCM models. The short control set of controls excludes the state health insurance rate, the supply of healthcare workers, and the binge drinking rate. These variables are mainly used for SCM matching in the pre-period, but are potentially bad controls after reform (Angrist and Pischke, 2009 ). In our preferred specification that includes only the short controls, we find a significant increase in annual admissions of 8.8% and a significant decrease in total clients of 11.6%. We also find a significant increase in acceptance of non-Medicaid public insurance of 4.6% and a significant decrease in the provision of charity care of 3.0%. Results are similar when using the longer set of controls. However, we interpret these regression DD estimates with caution and encourage readers to do the same as we find evidence that the parallel trends assumption is not met for the pre-policy period for three outcomes: acceptance of private insurance, acceptance of self-pay, and provision of charity care (Appendix Table 3B ). 26 Our failure to pass the parallel trends assumption further supports our use of the SCM as our core specification. . +Pre-reform MA mean/proportion is based on the N-SSATS microdata. DD, differences-in-differences; N-SSATS, National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services. 
CONCLUSIONS
We examined changes in the provision of specialty SUD treatment in Massachusetts after the implementation of a landmark 2006 law that achieved near universal health insurance coverage using SCMs (Abadie et al., 2010; Abadie et al., 2015; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) . Although numerous studies have examined the impact of this reform on a wide range of health insurance, healthcare, and health outcomes, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the impact of this reform on the provision of SUD treatment, or indeed SUD outcomes more broadly, using quasi-experimental methods. Moreover, because the Massachusetts reform is considered the blueprint for the ACA, our findings may be useful for predicting the impacts of the federal Act on the provision of SUD treatment. We hypothesized that Massachusetts health reform would increase the volume of individuals in treatment and significantly increase acceptance of private insurance. Overall, we do not find evidence that the reform significantly altered the number of individuals in treatment, the forms of payment accepted by treatment facilities, or the provision of charity care. Patterns are comparable when we separately examine the response of for-profit and non-profit facilities.
In supplementary analyses, we find that the reform influenced service delivery along other margins such as treatment setting (i.e., outpatient clients increased), increased provision of testing services, and reduced programs for special populations. These changes could reflect the increased importance of providing a set of services reimbursable within major private and public insurance programs, changes in patient population composition, and/or capacity constraints (e.g., it is likely more feasible to increase outpatient care, which might require adding a chair in a group counseling session, than to build inpatient bedrooms to accommodate new patients).
It is important to consider why we do not observe statistically significant changes in treatment quantity or treatment access. First, SUD facilities often operate at capacity that may prevent them from absorbing demand from newly insured patients (Carr et al., 2008) . Second, in addition to operating at capacity, SUD facilities typically have limited access to financial resources that may prevent them from expanding their operations when faced with demand increases (Buck, 2011) . Third, Massachusetts had one of the lowest rates of un-insurance prior to the 2006 reform, and thus, the reform may have expanded services to enough new patients for facilities to invest in new capacity building or implementation of new billing technologies required to bill private and public insurers. Fourth, for myriad reasons unrelated to cost or insurance coverage, the majority of individuals who could benefit from SUD treatment do not seek such treatment. Thus, obtaining insurance for such individuals may not have led to changes in their utilization of treatment services. The descriptive work of Capoccia et al. (2012) , which also fails to find large increases in admissions following the 2006 reform but finds some changes in service delivery, is in line with the primarily null findings that we report here.
We interpret our study as primarily revealing changes in the behavior of facilities. However, it is important to note that changes in the characteristics of populations in treatment could also influence the decisions that facilities make regarding services offered. That is, our findings represent a combination of demand and supply side factors.
Our study has other limitations that are important to consider when interpreting our findings. First, we lack an independent measure of demand for treatment. Second, we do not directly observe the profitability of accepting different patient populations. Third, our data source enables us to measure which types of insurance are accepted, but more nuanced issues such as intensity of facility participation in distinct insurance markets are not available. Fourth, our data appear to be somewhat noisy as can be observed in our graphical analysis of trends in our outcome variables. Fifth, it is troubling that the findings generated in SCM depart from those generated in standard regression DD model. We view the SCM as a stronger research design in our context, but note that instability in estimates across alternative research designs is a limitation of the study. Finally, because the N-SSATS is designed to track SUD services, the data set does not contain information on patient demographics (e.g., sex and race), and we cannot observe how the characteristics of patients in treatment may have been impacted by the Massachusetts healthcare reform.
Overall, we do not find evidence of significant changes in the number of patients served or types of payment accepted by SUD treatment providers in Massachusetts. Because SUD treatment providers are a component of the US safety net healthcare delivery system, our findings may provide insight for how other types of safety net providers have adapted to this large-scale healthcare reform. Moreover, because of similarities between the Massachusetts reform and the ACA, our findings may provide insight on the effects of national healthcare reform on SUD treatment facilities.
